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In recent years, a substantial body of work has emerged in the social sciences exploring 
differences in the behavior of men and women in various contexts. This paper contributes to 
this literature by investigating gender differences in attitudes towards corruption. It departs 
from the previous literature on gender and corruption by using experimental methodology. 
Attitudes towards corruption play a critical role in the persistence of corruption. Based on 
experimental data collected in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and 
Singapore, we show that while women in Australia are less tolerant of corruption than men in 
Australia, there are no significant gender differences in attitudes towards corruption in India, 
Indonesia and Singapore. Hence, our findings suggest that the gender differences found in the 
previous studies may not be nearly as universal as stated and may be more culture-specific. 
We also explore behavioral differences by gender across countries and find that there are 
larger variations in women’s attitudes towards corruption than in men’s across the countries 
in our sample.  
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1. Introduction 
  In recent years, a substantial body of work has emerged in the social sciences 
exploring differences in the behavior of men and women in various contexts. This paper 
contributes to this literature by investigating gender differences in attitudes towards 
corruption.  
  Due to the negative impact of corruption on economic development, eliminating 
corruption is a major concern for many countries. Two recent empirical papers have 
examined the relationship between gender and corruption. Dollar et al. (2001) use 
country-level data for a sample of more than 100 countries and find that the greater the 
representation of women in parliament, the lower the country’s level of perceived 
corruption. This finding is consistent with the findings of Swamy et al. (2001), who use 
both micro-level survey-data from a range of countries and country-level data. They 
also find that on average women are less tolerant of corruption than men.
1  
  This paper departs from these two papers by using experimental methodology, 
which allows us to explore individuals’ attitudes towards corruption.
2 One issue with 
drawing conclusions on the basis of surveys is that actual behavior (especially when 
confronted with non-trivial amounts of money) may be quite different from survey 
responses. Experiments differ from surveys and perception indices in that the 
participants in the experiments receive actual monetary payments, the amounts of which 
depend on the decisions they make during the experiments. Hence, we explore whether 
                                                 
1 Their micro-level data is based on surveys that ask respondents about the acceptability of various 
dishonest or illegal behaviors. From the micro-level data, they find that a larger proportion of women than 
men believe that illegal or dishonest behavior are never justifiable. These results are consistent with those 
of Glover et al. (1997) and Reiss and Mitra (1998), who find that gender affects whether an individual 
regards certain workplace behavior as unacceptable.  
2 In the experimental literature, behavioral differences between men and women have been studied using 
public goods, ultimatum, dictator, and trust games. The results have been mixed, with some studies 
suggesting that women are more socially oriented, others finding that men are more socially oriented, and 
still others finding that there are no significant gender differences. See, for example, Andreoni and 
Vesterlund (2001), Bolton and Katoc (1995), Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993), Nowell and Tinker 
(1994), Cadsby and Maynes (1998), Eckel and Grossman (1998 and 2000), Solnick (2001), etc.    2
the gender differences reported in the previous studies on corruption are also evident in 
an experimental setting.
3 
  Gender differences may be the result of both biological and social differences, 
i.e., differences in social roles of men and women. An individual’s social role and 
presence in the public domain may play an important role in that individual’s exposure 
to corruption. Hence, if women and men differ in their social roles, one may also expect 
them to differ in their attitudes towards corruption. Higher levels of exposure to 
corruption in daily life may promote a tolerance and acceptance of corruption that is 
reflected in norms of behavior. Moreover, women may be more victimized by (and, 
hence, less tolerant of) corruption in countries where their presence in the public domain 
is lower.
4 
  To investigate whether there are consistent gender differences across countries, 
we conducted experiments in four countries: Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), 
Indonesia (Jakarta), and Singapore. Two of the countries in our sample are consistently 
ranked among the least corrupt countries in the world (Australia and Singapore, with 
scores of 8.8 and 9.4 out of 10 respectively), and two of them are consistently ranked 
among the most corrupt (India and Indonesia, with scores of 2.8 and 1.9 respectively).
5 
  Our results show that the gender differences found in the previous studies, which 
are largely based on data from Western countries, are also evident in the experimental 
data from Australia. That is, Australian men are more likely to engage in and more 
tolerant of corruption than Australian women. However, we find no systematic gender 
                                                 
3 There is a growing literature that analyses corruption using experimental methodology. See Abbink 
(2005) for a survey. However, except for Frank and Schultz (2000), none of these papers explore the 
relationship between gender and corruption. Frank and Schultz (2000) analyze whether economists 
behave in a more self-interested way than other people. They find that economics students are 
significantly more corrupt than others, with male economists being the most corrupt and male non-
economists the least.  
4 Although all of the participants in our experiments were upper-level undergraduate or graduate students, 
their expectations and attitudes would nevertheless be influenced by the differing roles of men and 
women in their societies. 
5 See Table A1.    3
differences in the three Asian countries included in our study. Thus, gender differences 
in attitudes towards corruption appear not to be as robust as suggested by the previous 
evidence and may be culture-specific.  
  We also investigate whether cross-country variation in behavior is similar for 
men and women. Cross-country variation may reflect the differing levels of exposure to 
corruption in the different countries.
6 Women may react differently to this exposure 
than men since there may be a larger variation in the social roles of women than in the 
social roles of men across countries. The results do reveal that there is a larger variation 
in the behavior of women across the four countries we study than in the behavior of 
men. 
The paper proceeds as follows. We discuss the experimental design in Section 2. 
The results are presented in Section 3. We conclude by discussing the implications of 
our results and avenues for future research in Section 4.  
  
2.   Experimental Design and Procedure  
  In our experiment, corruption is defined as a situation where two people can act 
to increase their own payoff at the expense of a third person. The transaction that takes 
place between the two people is assumed to be illegal. Hence, the third person, the 
victim, is allowed to punish them at a cost.  
  More specifically, the experiment is based on a three-person, sequential-move 
game. The first player in the game is called the firm and is given the option to initiate a 
corrupt act by offering a bribe to a government official in order to increase his/her own 
payoff at the expense of society. The second player, whom we call the official, can 
either reject or accept the bribe. The third player represents society and is called the 
                                                 
6 See Cameron et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion of how attitudes towards corruption vary across the 
four countries considered in this study.    4
citizen. This player can respond to the act of corruption by choosing to punish both the 
firm and the official. The punishment is costly to the citizen, and imposes a monetary 
sanction on the firm and the official.
 7 
  This set-up allows us to examine two types of attitudes towards corruption: the 
incentive to engage in a corrupt act from which one reaps benefits and the incentive to 
incur a cost to punish a corrupt act that decreases one’s payoff. This distinction enables 
us to examine whether individuals behave differently depending on whether they 
directly benefit from a corrupt act. 
  Figure 1 contains an extensive-form representation of the game, where all of the 
payoffs are denoted in experimental dollars. We constrain the amount of the bribe that 
the firm can offer to B ∈ [4, 8]. It costs the firm two experimental dollars to offer a 
bribe and the firm incurs this cost regardless of whether the bribe is accepted. If a bribe 
is offered, then the official decides whether to accept it. If the official accepts the bribe, 
then the payoffs of the firm and the official increase by 3B. The payoff of the citizen 
decreases by the amount of the bribe, B. Hence, the net benefit to the firm from paying 
the bribe is 3B – 2. This may, for example, represent the benefit the firm gets from 
avoiding a regulation. We assume that the official’s payoff also increases by 3B even 
though the amount of bribe paid by the firm is B. This is due to an assumption of 
difference in the marginal utilities of income. Since the income earned in the public 
service is likely to be lower than that earned in private firms, the same amount of money 
can be assumed to have a lower marginal utility value to the firm than to the official.
8 
                                                 
7 We chose to use emotive terms such as “bribe” and “punishment” in the instructions since our aim was 
to simulate a real-life corrupt transaction. Cooper and Kagel (2003) consider the role of loaded language 
in signaling games and suggest that the use of a meaningful context might better capture behavior in field 
settings than the use of neutral language. On the other hand, Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2002) find that 
the use of words like “bribe” do not make a difference in the corruption game that they study.  
8 The choices of multipliers have the additional advantage of helping us prevent negative total payoffs.    5
  If a bribe has been offered and accepted, the citizen, who moves last after 
observing the choices made by the firm and the official, is given a chance to punish the 
firm and the official for the corrupt transaction. The citizen can choose an amount P in 
punishment. Such punishment is costly for the citizen and reduces the citizen’s payoff 
by the amount of the punishment, P. If the citizen chooses to punish, then the payoffs of 
the firm and the official are reduced by three times the amount of the punishment 
chosen by the citizen. 
  In the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, a payoff-maximizing citizen 
does not punish. Knowing this, the official accepts the bribe and the firm offers the 
bribe. Moreover, the firm offers the maximum amount of bribe it can since its payoff is 
increasing in the amount it offers.  
  We have deliberately chosen to conduct a one-shot game because in a one-shot 
game the punishment has no economic benefit to the citizen. The decision to punish is 
not affected by the anticipation of possible future economic gains. This implies that if 
we observe any punishment by the citizens, we can infer that it is motivated by either 
negative reciprocity or moral considerations. Hence, with a one-shot game, a 
comparison of the citizens’ willingness to punish across different countries reveals the 
differences in the tolerance levels for corrupt acts in those countries.   
  The one-shot nature of the game also helps us avoid issues associated with 
repeated games, such as signaling, reputation formation and serial correlation in 
decisions. Each subject in our database participated in the experiment only once and 
played only one role.
9 The subjects playing the three roles were grouped anonymously 
in the experiment to avoid conscious or unconscious signaling. 
                                                 
9 One standard response in cases such as these is to have random re-matching of subjects. Kandori (1992) 
states that it is not clear whether random re-matchings do actually succeed in eliminating supergame 
effects. However, Duffy and Ochs (2005) consider an experiment with an indefinitely repeated 2-player 
prisoner’s dilemma game and find that contrary to Kandori’s theoretical conjecture, a cooperative norm   6
  The experiments were run at the University of Melbourne, the Delhi School of 
Economics, the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, and the National University of 
Singapore using third year undergraduate or postgraduate students. In order to minimize 
the experimenter effects, we made sure that one of the authors (the same one) was 
present in all the countries where we ran the experiment.
10  
All the sessions were run as non-computerized experiments. At the beginning of 
each session subjects were asked to come to a large lecture theatre. Each session 
consisted of at least 30 subjects. These subjects, on entering the room, were randomly 
designated as either firms, officials or citizens. Each group was located far apart from 
the others in a recognizable cluster. Thus, each group could see the members of the 
other groups, but individual subjects were unaware of which three specific subjects 
constituted a particular firm-official-citizen trio.  
  At the beginning of each session, each subject received a copy of the game’s 
instructions, which were then read out loud to them. They were also given a number of 
examples explaining how the payoffs would be calculated for specific bribe and 
punishment amounts. Then, the subjects playing the role of a firm were asked to decide 
whether or not to offer a bribe. If they chose to offer a bribe, they also had to choose an 
amount. After they made their decisions, the record sheets with the bribe amounts were 
collected by the experimenter and distributed to the corresponding officials. After the 
officials made their decisions, the record sheets of both the firms and the government 
officials were given to the corresponding citizens. Hence, the citizens learned whether a 
bribe was offered and whether it was accepted. The game ended after the citizens 
decided whether to punish by choosing a punishment amount. All the subjects were then 
                                                                                                                                               
does not emerge in the treatments where players are matched randomly. In the current paper we decided 
to adopt a conservative stance and have players participate in pure one-shot games to avoid any repeated 
game effects.   
10 Roth et al. (1991) and Cardenas and Carpenter (2005) discuss the methodological issues arising in 
multi-site experiments.   7
asked to fill out a demographic survey, which included questions on age, gender, 
income, education stream, employment history, and frequency of exposure to 
corruption. Those in the role of the citizen were also asked to explain the motivation for 
their decisions.
11 
  Each experiment lasted about an hour. At the end of each session, the decisions 
made by all of the subjects were entered into a spreadsheet which generated their 
payoffs. The payoffs were converted into cash using an appropriate conversion rate, 
taking into consideration purchasing power parity across the countries where the 
experiment  was conducted.
12 These conversion rates were public information. To 
guarantee parity in the payoffs to the different type of players (firm, official and 
citizen), we used a different conversion rate for each type.
13 
   
3. Results   
Given our experimental design, we are interested in exploring two issues. In 
Section 3.1, we start by investigating whether, controlling for culture (i.e., within each 
country), women are less tolerant towards corruption than men. We then control for 
gender in Section 3.2 and investigate whether there are larger cross-country variations 
in the attitudes of women towards corruption than in the attitudes of men.  
  A total of 1326 subjects participated in the experiments. Of these, 596 (45%) 
were men. The number of participants in Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore were 
642, 309, 180 and 195 respectively.  
                                                 
11 The instruction, record and survey sheets are available from the authors upon request. 
12 The conversion rates in each country were based on 1) the standard hourly wage paid for a student 
research assistant in each country, and 2) a typical basket of goods bought by students in each country. 
This is similar to the procedure used by other researchers who have conducted cross-cultural studies (e.g., 
Carpenter and Cardenas, 2004 and Cardenas and Carpenter, 2005). 
13 In Australia, the conversion rates were 3 experimental currency = 1 real currency for the firms, 2 
experimental currency = 1 real currency for the officials and 1.5 experimental currency = 1 real currency 
for the citizens. Each subject made on average AU$20. This amount is approximately equivalent to 
US$15. In India subjects were paid an average of US$11, in Singapore US$13, and in Indonesia US$9.   8
  We report results based on t-tests and multivariate regression analysis, where we 
estimated binary probit models for the bribe, acceptance and punishment rates, and 
ordinary least square models for the bribe and punishment amounts. The regression 
results control for treatment effects as well as other variables not accounted for in the t-
tests, such as field of study (whether it is economics) and the percentage of each 
Australian subject’s life that has been spent outside of Australia.
14 Of the variables we 
collected information on in the surveys, these were found to be the only ones that were 
consistently significant determinants of subject behavior.
15 In the regressions for the 
officials’ and citizens’ behavior, we also control for the bribe amount.  
  The reported results are based on two different treatments that were conducted. 
In the Indian experiments and a subset of the Australian sessions, the citizens’ 
punishment range was restricted to P ∈ [2, 8].
16 We refer to this treatment as 
“Treatment 1.” In the other countries and the remaining Australian sessions, the 
punishment range was extended to P ∈ [2, 12].
17 This is “Treatment 2.” The t-tests 
below make comparisons within treatment and the regression results include a control 
for treatment. The variation in treatment design enabled us to examine the effectiveness 
of the punishment regime. We discuss the treatment effects in detail in Cameron et al 
(2005). Since the focus of the current paper is gender differences and since gender 
                                                 
14 The last variable controls for the high number of foreign students that study in Australian universities. 
The majority of these students come from Asia. We find this variable to be insignificant in explaining 
behavior in most of the regressions. This is possibly because those who choose to study in Australia are 
more westernized than their counterparts and/or quickly absorb the social norms of the new environment.  
15 We collected information on age, gender, field of study, work experience, income, exposure to 
corruption and time spent in developed countries. 
16 Due to resource constraints, we do not have data for all treatments from all the countries.  
17 These values were chosen to guarantee two things. First, we wanted to ensure that no one obtained a 
negative payoff. Second, we wanted to make sure that the average earning was high enough to offset the 
participants’ opportunity cost of time (Davis and Holt, 1993).    9
differences do not vary across the treatments, we do not discuss the treatments effects 
here.
18      
3.1  Are women less tolerant of corruption than men?  
  As stated above, both Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) find that 
women are less tolerant of corruption than men. Within the design of our experiment, 
this is equivalent to asking whether female participants in the four countries where we 
ran our experiment had a lower propensity to pay bribes, a lower propensity to accept 
bribes, and a higher propensity to punish bribery than the male participants.  
  Table 1 presents the results of t-tests for differences in the means of the behavior 
of the male and female participants in the three roles. Panel A pools the data and shows 
that overall the male participants have a higher propensity to bribe than the female 
participants (p = 0.04), but that there are no other statistically significant gender 
differences in behavior. However, if we break the data down by individual countries 
(Panels B-E), we observe that the difference in the bribe rates is driven by Australia (p = 
0.02). In Australia, 92% of male participants offered bribes compared with 80% of 
female participants. In none of the other countries do we see significant gender 
differences in the propensities to offer bribes. Further, in Australia, the male subjects 
also had higher acceptance rates and lower punishment rates than the female subjects. 
The bribe was accepted 91.59% of the time when it was offered to a male participant in 
Australia while it was accepted 80% of the time when it was offered to a female 
participant. This difference is statistically significant according to a test of difference of 
means (p = 0.02). The Australian male participants in the role of the citizen chose to 
                                                 
18 Cameron et al. (2005) also presents and discusses results from a further, third treatment. In both 
Treatments 1 and 2, the bribe is welfare-enhancing, in that the total payoff gains to the firm and the 
official exceed the payoff loss to the citizen. In Treatment 3, the payoffs are altered so that the combined 
gains to the firm and the official are less than the payoff loss to the citizen. Hence, the bribe is welfare-
reducing. Since the gender differences are similar across all three treatments, we chose not to discuss 
Treatment 3 in this paper for ease of exposition.     10
punish 49.15% of the time while the Australian female participants chose to punish 
62.63% of the time. This difference is significant at the 10% level. 
  In India, Indonesia and Singapore, we find no significant differences in the 
behavior of the male and female participants in the three roles. The point estimates also 
do not vary systematically by gender. For example, in India men bribe more often, but 
also punish more often.  
  The regression results presented in Table 2 confirm the results from the t-tests.
19 
Panel A pools all the data across all the countries. Overall, men offer bribes with a 
higher frequency (significant at the 5% level) and punish corrupt acts by higher amounts 
(significant at the 10% level). In Panel B, the effect of gender is allowed to differ by 
country. For example, the coefficient on the variable “Male-Australia”  captures the 
difference between men and women in Australia. The results show that in Australia men 
bribe approximately 8 percentage points more often, accept bribes approximately 8 
percentage points more often, and punish bribery about 14 percentage points less often 
than women. However, if the Australian men do punish, then they do so by a larger 
amount than women. In the other countries, there are no significant gender differences 
in the bribe, acceptance, and punishment rates. The only significant differences we find 
are in the bribe and punishment amounts. Specifically, the Indian male subjects, when 
they bribe, offer larger bribes than the Indian female subjects, and the Indonesian male 
subjects, when they punish, offer higher punishment amounts than the Indonesian 
female subjects.   
 
 
                                                 
19 We also estimated ordered probit models for positive bribe and punishment amounts. These recognize 
that the dependent variable is not continuous. The results were very similar to the reported results from 
the estimation of ordinary least squares models.    11
3.2  Does the cross-country variation in attitudes towards corruption differ by 
gender?  
Our finding in the previous section is that the differences between men and 
women do not necessarily lead to statistically significant behavioral differences in terms 
of corruption. Another way to think of the impact of social roles is to observe how it 
affects the behavior of one gender across countries. To do this, we start by discussing 
the variations in the attitudes of men. Table 3A, Panels (i)-(iv) compare the means of 
behavior across the Australian, Indian, Indonesian and Singaporean male subjects. 
These pairwise country comparisons show that there are no significant differences in the 
propensities to bribe, the bribe amounts, and the propensities to accept. Hence, in terms 
of the incentives to engage in corrupt behavior, the male subjects in all four countries 
display similar tendencies.  
  It is only when we consider the incentives to punish corrupt behavior that we see 
some significant differences in the behavior of male subjects in the four countries. 
Specifically, the Indonesian male subjects have the highest rate of punishment followed 
by the Australian male subjects (76.47% and 50% respectively). This difference is 
significant at the 10% level. The Singaporean male subjects punished in 39.13% of the 
cases. Although their rate of punishment is not statistically significantly different from 
that of the Australian male subjects (p = 0.46), it is significantly less than that of the 
Indonesian male subjects (p = 0.02). The Indian male subjects have the lowest 
punishment rate of all (27.27%). This is significantly less than the punishment rate of 
the Australian male subjects (p = 0.06).    12
  The regression results presented in Table 2, Panel C confirm the results from the 
t-tests.
20 We test for equality of coefficients across the four countries for each gender. 
As shown in the table, the tests indicate that we are unable to reject the hypothesis that 
male behavior in each of the countries is the same, except in the case of punishment 
rates (p = 0.08). In the case of punishment rates, the regression results show that, once 
we control for field of study (whether it is economics), the percentage of each 
Australian subject’s life that has been spent outside of Australia, and treatment effects, 
the punishment behavior of the male subjects in Australia is not significantly different 
from that in any of the other countries. However, since the male subjects in Indonesia 
have significantly higher rates of punishment than those in India and Singapore, we get 
the result that the coefficients in this case are not equal to each other.
21 
  In contrast, the t-tests reported in Table 3B and regression results reported in 
Table 2, Panel C reveal differences in female behavior across the four countries in all 
categories of comparison. Testing for equality of regression coefficients, we find that at 
the 5% level, female behavior varies across the four countries in the case of bribe rates, 
bribe amounts, and punishment rates. In the case of acceptance rates and punishment 
amounts, we are only narrowly unable to reject a hypothesis of equality of coefficients 
at the 10% level (with p-values of 0.12 and 0.11 respectively). Moreover, unreported 
pairwise tests of the regression coefficients show that the acceptance rate in Singapore 
is significantly higher than that in each of the other three countries.  
                                                 
20 These results are the same as those presented in Table 2, Panel B. However, they are configured (by 
interacting both the male and female dummies with the country dummies) to enable an easier 
interpretation of within-gender cross-country differences. 
21 The pairwise regression tests give p-values of 0.058 and 0.028 respectively. The high rate of 
punishment we observe among the Indonesian male subjects is an unexpected outcome given the high 
level of corruption in this country. One possible explanation for this outcome is the recent institutional 
changes that have occurred in Indonesia. Since the introduction of democracy in Indonesia in 1998 and 
the relaxation of media restrictions, corruption has received a lot more negative media attention. This may 
have resulted in a hardening of attitudes against corruption. See Cameron et al. (2005) for a more detailed 
discussion of the cultural differences we find. 
   13
  The magnitude of the cross-country variation in female behavior is quite large. 
For instance, the regression results show that the female bribe rate in Australia is 16.6 
percentage points lower than that in Indonesia and 17.2 percentage points lower than 
that in Singapore (p = 0.02 and p = 0.007 respectively). Similarly, the female 
acceptance rate in Singapore is 19.7 percentage points higher than that in Australia, 15.2 
percentage points higher than that in India, and 12.9 percentage points higher than that 
in Indonesia (p = 0.016, p = 0.089, and p = 0.089 respectively).
22 
  In summary, we find less variation in the attitudes of men towards corruption 
than in the attitudes of women across the four countries. When we compare the behavior 
of the male subjects, we find significant differences only in the propensity to punish 
corrupt behavior. In contrast, when we compare the behavior of the female subjects, we 
find significant differences both in the propensity to engage in corrupt behavior (in the 
bribe rate and amount) and the propensity to punish corrupt behavior. Overall the 
Australian female subjects seem to have the lowest level of tolerance of corrupt 
behavior.   
  
4. Discussion 
  Our goal in this paper was to examine whether there are gender differences in 
attitudes towards corruption. We explored two issues. First, we investigated whether 
women are less likely to offer bribes and more likely to punish corrupt behavior. We 
find this to be the case in only one of the four countries studied – Australia. We do not 
find significant gender differences in India, Indonesia or Singapore. 
                                                 
22 As explained in Cameron et al (2005), one possible explanation for the relatively higher tolerance of 
corruption we find in Singapore is the top-down policy approach that has been adopted in this country. 
Such an approach could have had the effect of eradicating corruption at a faster rate than it takes to 
fundamentally change society’s social norms.   14
  The results for the only Western country in our study are similar to those found 
in the existing literature. In both Dollar et al (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001), the 
Western countries make up a large part of their sample.
23,24 Our findings suggest that 
the gender differences found in these previous studies may be culture-specific. This is 
important because the gender differences found in the previous studies on corruption 
have prompted policy makers in many developing countries to recommend higher rates 
of female participation in the political and economic institutions. Our results indicate 
that, although there may be other valid reasons for advocating policy measures that 
promote female political involvement, some caution needs to be taken in asserting that 
increased female participation will lower corruption in all countries.
25 Further work is 
needed to understand the reasons for the variations in gender differences in attitudes 
towards corruption across countries and to establish in which countries gender 
differences do exist. It is possible that countries with different cultural backgrounds 
display gender differences to different degrees.  
  The second issue we investigated is whether cross-country variation in behavior 
is similar for men and women. The behavior of the male subjects was shown to be quite 
similar in all four countries. In contrast, the cross-country variation in female behavior 
is quite striking. One possible explanation for these results is that women’s attitudes 
may be influenced to a greater degree by their cultural surrounds. Further, these results 
may reflect the differences in the social roles of men and women, or the larger 
variations in women’s social roles across countries than in men’s. Both of these factors 
                                                 
23 Swamy et al. (2001) present some results disaggregated to the country level. Interestingly, scrutiny of 
these results reveals that there are no gender differences in tolerance of corruption in the three Asian 
nations in their sample (China, India and South Korea). This is also true of Nigeria, the only African 
nation in their sample other than South Africa.   
24 Most of the previous experimental studies that have examined behavioral gender differences have been 
based on data from the Western nations, with the majority being from the U.S. 
25 See Duflo (2005) for a discussion of the various reasons for reserving positions for groups that are 
perceived as being disadvantaged. 
   15
could cause the cross-country variation in attitudes towards corruption to differ by 
gender. These are all issues worthy of further research.    16
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Table 1: Gender Differences 
 
A. All Countries, Treatments 1 and 2 
 Male  Female  p-value 
% firms bribing  90.52  83.98  0.04 
Bribe Amount (if >0)  7.59  7.55  0.63 
% officials accepting  88.64  84.21  0.21 
% citizens punishing  44.06  51.85  0.16 
Punishment Amount (if >0)  6.05  5.37  0.24 
     
B. Australia, Treatments 1 and 2 
 Male  Female  p-value 
% firms bribing  91.59  80.37  0.02 
Bribe Amount (if >0)  7.63  7.72  0.42 
% officials accepting  92.13  80.00  0.02 
% citizens punishing  49.15  62.63  0.10 
Punishment Amount (if >0)  6.48  5.34  0.12 
     
C. India, Treatment 1     
 Male  Female  p-value 
% firms bribing  95.92  92.59  0.48 
Bribe Amount (if >0)  7.57  7.18  0.10 
% officials accepting  89.74  89.66  0.99 
% citizens punishing  27.27  20.93  0.50 
Punishment Amount (if >0)  3.25  4.33  0.30 
 
D. Indonesia, Treatment 2 
 Male  Female  p-value 
% firms bribing  78.13  82.14  0.70 
Bribe Amount (if >0)  7.40  7.61  0.47 
% officials accepting  77.27  76.92  0.98 
% citizens punishing  76.47  70.00  0.67 
Punishment Amount (if >0)  7.00  4.29  0.12 
     
E. Singapore, Treatment 2 
 Male  Female  p-value 
% firms bribing  91.30  83.33  0.38 
Bribe Amount (if >0)  7.67  7.60  0.77 
% officials accepting  84.62  93.33  0.30 
% citizens punishing  39.13  48.15  0.53 
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Table 2: Multivariate Regression Results  
 
A. Pooled Regression Results 
  Bribe (0/1)  Bribe Amount (>0)  Accept (0/1)  Punish (0/1)  Punishment Amount (>0) 
                            
  1  2    3  4   5  6   7  8   9  10   
  M. Effect
♣  p-value   Coeff  p-value    M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
  M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
 Coeff  p-value   
India   0.059  0.32    -0.456  0.03  * 0.012  0.86    -0.277  0.01  ⌂ -2.154 0.05  * 
Indonesia  0.073  0.08  # -0.254  0.23   0.025  0.68   0.045  0.72   -1.068  0.30   
Singapore 0.105  0.00  ⌂ -0.096  0.64   0.100  0.06 # -0.224  0.04 * 0.665  0.53   
Male  0.063  0.04  * 0.089  0.35   0.035  0.31   -0.062  0.29   1.008  0.08  # 
Econ major  0.026  0.42    0.200  0.05  * 0.082  0.03  * -0.159  0.01  ⌂ -0.380 0.58   
% life out of Australia  0.148  0.01  ⌂ -0.119  0.55   0.092  0.14   -0.060  0.56   -0.730  0.42   
Treatment 1  0.148  0.00  ⌂ 0.031 0.82    0.090  0.08  # -0.105  0.20    -0.741  0.32   
Bribe  amount              -0.007  0.71   -0.035  0.27   0.191  0.55   
const       7.641  0.00  ⌂          4.797  0.05  * 
                            
R-squared 0.102  0.012  0.056  0.102  0.046 
N 440  383  384  332  161 
♣ We report marginal effects for the probits. * (#, ⌂) denotes statistical significance at the 5% (10%, 1%) level. 
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B. Pooled Data, Gender-Country Interaction (Australian Female Subjects are the reference category.) 
  Bribe (0/1)  Bribe Amount (>0)  Accept (0/1)  Punish (0/1)  Punishment Amount (>0) 
                            
  1  2    3  4   5  6   7  8   9  10   
  M. Effect
♣  p-value   Coeff  p-value    M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
  M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
 Coeff  p-value   
India   0.074  0.26    -0.725  0.00  ⌂ 0.036 0.61    -0.367 0.00  ⌂ -0.95 0.50   
Indonesia    0.105  0.02  * -0.179  0.49   0.051  0.44   -0.047  0.76   -1.85  0.12   
Singapore   0.110  0.01  ⌂ -0.181  0.45   0.135  0.02 * -0.237  0.07 # 1.33  0.28   
Male-Aust    0.083  0.02  * -0.044  0.74   0.084  0.06 # -0.143  0.08 # 1.34  0.09  # 
Male-India   0.048  0.44    0.472  0.01  ⌂ -0.024  0.73   0.073  0.54   -0.95  0.54   
Male-Indonesia    -0.030  0.68   -0.203  0.43   -0.008  0.92   0.070  0.69   2.74  0.04  * 
Male-Singapore    0.060  0.33    0.110  0.66    -0.121  0.30    -0.101  0.48    0.497  0.74   
Econ major  0.027  0.39    0.198  0.05  * 0.083  0.03  * -0.160  0.01  ⌂ -0.364 0.59   
% life out of Australia  0.152  0.01  ⌂ -0.135  0.50   0.078  0.21   -0.063  0.54   -0.793  0.38   
Treatment 1  0.145  0.00  ⌂ 0.040  0.76   0.077  0.13   -0.101  0.22   -0.777  0.29   
Bribe  amount              -0.007  0.72   -0.035  0.28   0.192  0.55   
const       7.719  0.00  ⌂          4.728  0.06  # 
                            
                            
R-squared 0.110  0.022  0.069  0.108  0.055 
N 440  383  384  332  161 
♣ We report marginal effects for the probits. * (#, ⌂) denotes statistical significance at the 5% (10%, 1%) level. 
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 C. Pooled Data, Gender-Country Interaction (Australian Male Subjects are the reference category.) 
  Bribe (0/1)  Bribe Amount (>0)  Accept (0/1)  Punish (0/1)  Punishment Amount (>0) 
                           
  1  2   3  4   5  6   7  8   9  10  
  M. Effect
♣  p-value   Coeff  p-value  M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
  M. Effect
♣  p-
value 
 Coeff  p-value   
Female-Australia (α1)  -0.117  0.02 * 0.044  0.74   -0.112  0.06 # 0.145  0.08 # -1.34  0.09  # 
Female-India (α2) -0.011  0.89    -0.681  0.00  ⌂ -0.067 0.46    -0.237 0.06  # -2.30  0.13   
Female-Indonesia (α3)  0.049  0.38  -0.135  0.60   -0.044  0.64   0.098  0.53   -3.19  0.02  * 
Female-Singapore (α4)  0.055  0.28  -0.137  0.55   0.085  0.24   -0.102  0.47   -0.019  0.99   
Male-India (β1)  0.040  0.59  -0.209  0.36   -0.036  0.69   -0.172  0.17   -3.244  0.02  * 
Male-Indonesia (β2)  0.029  0.62  -0.338  0.18   -0.054  0.59   0.166  0.31   -0.452  0.74   
Male-Singapore (β3)  0.089  0.08 # -0.027  0.92   0.016  0.85   -0.196  0.17   -0.507  0.74   
Econ major  0.027  0.39    0.198  0.05  * 0.083  0.03  * -0.160  0.01  ⌂ -0.364 0.59   
% life out of Australia  0.152  0.01  ⌂ -0.135  0.50   0.078  0.21   -0.063  0.54   -0.793  0.38   
Treatment 1  0.145  0.00  ⌂ 0.040  0.76   0.077  0.13   -0.101  0.22   -0.777  0.29   
Bribe  amount              -0.007  0.72   -0.035  0.28   0.192  0.55   
Const       7.719  0.00  ⌂          4.728  0.06  # 
                           
Tests:                           
Female: (α1= α2= α3= α4)    0.04 *   0.02 *   0.12     0.01 ⌂  0.11   
Male: (β1= β2= β3)    0.35     0.48     0.86     0.08 #   0.14   
                           
R-squared 0.110  0.022  0.069  0.108  0.055 
N 440  383  384  332  161 
♣ We report marginal effects for the probits. * (#, ⌂) denotes statistical significance at the 5% (10%, 1%) level. 
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(Treatment 1)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  96.15  95.92  0.95 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.60  7.57  0.89 
% of officials accepting  96.30  89.74  0.21 
% of citizens punishing  48.48  27.27  0.06 




 (Treatment 2) 
Indonesia 
(Treatment 2)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  87.27  78.13  0.27 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.67  7.40  0.22 
% of officials accepting  85.71  77.27  0.42 
% of citizens punishing  50.00  76.47  0.09 




 (Treatment 2) 
Singapore 
(Treatment 2)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  87.27  91.30  0.62 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.67  7.67  1.00 
% of officials accepting  85.71  84.62  0.91 
% of citizens punishing  50.00  39.13  0.46 




 (Treatment 2) 
Singapore 
(Treatment 2)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  78.13  91.30  0.20 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.40  7.67  0.38 
% of officials accepting  77.27  84.62  0.53 
% of citizens punishing  76.47  39.13  0.02 
Punishment amount (if >0)  7.00  7.00  1.00 
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(Treatment 1)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  95.12  92.59  0.62 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.82  7.18  0.01 
% of officials accepting  82.86  89.66  0.35 
% of citizens punishing  56.25  20.93  0.00 




 (Treatment 2) 
Indonesia 
(Treatment 2)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  71.21  82.14  0.27 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.64  7.61  0.88 
% of officials accepting  78.33  76.92  0.89 
% of citizens punishing  68.63  70.00  0.91 




 (Treatment 2) 
Singapore 
(Treatment 2)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  71.21  83.33  0.15 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.64  7.60  0.83 
% of officials accepting  78.33  93.33  0.07 
% of citizens punishing  68.63  48.15  0.08 




 (Treatment 2) 
Singapore 
(Treatment 2)  p-value 
% of firms bribing  82.14  83.33  0.90 
Bribe amount (if >0)  7.61  7.60  0.97 
% of officials accepting  76.92  93.33  0.08 
% of citizens punishing  70.00  48.15  0.14 
Punishment amount (if >0)  4.29  7.38  0.04   25
APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: The 2003 Corruptions Perceptions Index  
 
RANK COUNTRY  SCORE 
1. Finland  9.7 
2. Iceland  9.6 
3.  Denmark 
New Zealand  9.5 
5. Singapore  9.4 
…    
7. Netherlands  8.9 
8.  Australia  8.8 
…    
11. United  Kingdom  8.7 
…    
18. USA  7.5 
25 Portugal  6.6 
35 Italy  5.3 
50 Greece  4.3 






86.  Russia 
Mozambique  2.7 
…    
122.  Indonesia 
Kenya  1.9 
…    
133. Bangladesh  1.3 
    
Source: Transparency International 
 
 